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Abstract 
Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is at variance with the neo-Darwinian theory of 
inheritance, and this possibly has important implications for how we view evolution, since it 
could allow for a kind of inheritance of acquired characteristics. We have applied Imre Lakatos 
and Thomas Kuhn’s models of scientific change and investigated if they can accurately describe 
the change in the view on inheritance from neo-Darwinism to a view that includes 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, and if so, which model most precisely describes this 
change. Kuhn views two paradigms as incommensurable and science as non-cumulative, 
whereas Lakatos does not. Neo-Darwinism views DNA as the only agent of heredity, whereas 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance allow for other mechanisms, but despite this important 
difference, they share much basic knowledge, scientific journals and formal education of their 
practitioners. We found that both programmes in Lakatos’ model for scientific change were 
theoretically and empirically progressive, which indicated that none of the programmes should 
be abandoned. This case fits both Lakatos’ views on incommensurability and the accumulation 
of knowledge, as well as his view that change in science can be a slow process with programmes 
competing for years before one of them is abandoned. On this basis we can conclude that 
Lakatos’ model for scientific change is the best fitting for describing this scientific change in the 
view on inheritance and thereby evolution.  
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Preface 
This project is devised by group 11A: Ida Axholm, Kasper Ranum, Redaa Al-Makdisi Razeeghi, 
as a third semester project on the Bachelor Of Natural Sciences at Roskilde University, from 
September to December 2014. 
The aim of this project is to investigate the differences between the neo-Darwinian 
gene-centered view of inheritance and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, necessitated by 
new evidence for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, and to analyze these views using Imre 
Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn’s respective theories of scientific change, to see which theory best 
can describe the change in view. The topics of epigenetics and changes in science relates to the 
semester theme, which says to study scientific phenomena in the context of philosophy of 
science. 
We would like to thank our supervisor Torben Brauner, for good guidance, and our 
opponent groups and their respective supervisors, Jesper Olsen and Ole Skovgaard for 
constructive criticism.  
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Introduction  
The concept of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, a part of the field of epigenetics, poses a 
way for epigenetic variation to get inherited through meiosis (Daxinger and Whitelaw, 2012; 
Grossniklaus et al., 2013; Heard and Martienssen, 2014; Jablonka and Raz, 2009). It is 
sometimes seen as the molecular analogy to the Lamarckian idea of inheritance of acquired 
characteristics (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Burggren, 2014), which has been controversial for 
many years due to influence of neo-Darwinism – a fusion of the Darwinian idea of natural 
selection, The Modern Synthesis, and molecular genetics and its gene-centered view of 
inheritance (Gilbert and Epel, 2009; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Depew and Weber, 2011; Noble, 
2010). The inheritance of variation is a key part of evolutionary theory, and one of the basic 
tenets of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution is the supremacy of DNA as the agent of 
heredity. Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance directly challenges this tenet of neo-
Darwinism, and could therefore have great implications for the neo-Darwinian theory of 
evolution. (Jablonka and Raz, 2009; Danchin and Pocheville, 2014; Danchin et al., 2011). Many 
suggest an extension or revision of neo-Darwinism (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Depew and 
Weber, 2009; Danchin and Pocheville, 2014; Pigliucci, 2007; Danchin et al., 2011). And some 
even describe the change from the neo-Darwinian gene-centered view of inheritance to a view 
including transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, as a paradigm shift (Kaiser, 2014; Baluška, 
2011). This brings us to discuss the work of Thomas Kuhn, the originator of the paradigm shift 
theory, to examine whether this change really is a paradigm shift. Since it is sometimes argued 
that it is hard to find good examples of real Kuhnian paradigm shifts, at least in biology 
(Pigliucci, 2007), we are also discussing the work of Imre Lakatos, who does not share Kuhn’s 
views on incommensurability, the lack of a common unit of measurement between theories, and 
the non-accumulative nature of science. 
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Problem formulation 
Can the differences between the neo-Darwinian theory of inheritance and transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance, and their implications for the view on evolution, best be described by 
Imre Lakatos or Thomas Kuhn’s theories of scientific change? 
 
Delimitation 
In this project we are investigating the phenomenon of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, 
and examining how well the theories of scientific change, propagated by Kuhn and Lakatos, can 
describe the change from a gene-centered, neo-Darwinian view on inheritance to a view that 
includes transgenerational inheritance. In this project we have made several delimitations. 
First, we are only working with the part of epigenetics concerned with inheritance 
through meiosis, which is through the gametes. This excludes all of the epigenetics concerned 
with developmental processes and all epigenetic inheritance through mitosis. 
Second, the change in how inheritance is viewed has implications for evolution, which 
we have discussed. However we are concerned with a change in the view on how variation arises 
and not a change in the view on how selection occurs, though this aspect of evolution is 
important and is therefore discussed as well. 
Third, there are several different ways to define when epigenetic inheritance is 
considered transgenerational. In this project we have chosen the strictest definition, which 
minimizes confounding of results in experiments by environmental effects. We will elaborate on 
this definition in a later section. 
Fourth, we have chosen to use Kuhn and Lakatos’ theories of scientific change in this 
project. We have chosen Kuhn, because the change from the neo-Darwinian view on inheritance 
to transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is often described as a paradigm shift, and sometimes 
without putting forward arguments for this view. We wish to examine if this change is indeed a 
paradigm shift. Lakatos is chosen since he does not share Kuhn’s views on incommensurability 
and the non-cumulative nature of science. 
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Relation to the semester theme 
The semester relation for the third semester of the Bachelor of Natural Sciences at RUC is as 
follows: 
“The purpose of the project is that the student gains experience concerning with scientific theory 
analysis of science as a historical, cultural and social phenomenon by means of working with a 
representative example.” 
The semester relation can be divided into two main guidelines for the project. 
The first guideline is that the project ought to have a scientific approach. In this project 
examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, and its mechanisms, are examined. 
The second guideline is that the chosen scientific subject should be studied in a historical, 
philosophical, cultural or social context. In this project inheritance is analyzed with the theories 
of scientific change propagated by the two philosophers of science Imre Lakatos and Thomas 
Kuhn. 
 
Target group 
The target group of this project is students at the third semester of the Bachelor of Natural 
Sciences at RUC, with interest in molecular biology. As the project is about epigenetic and the 
implications of it for the view in evolution, it might also interest students of evolutionary 
biology. Furthermore the project presupposes, that the students have a certain level of knowledge 
within the fields of genetics and epigenetics, as well as in physiology and anatomy. 
 
Method 
In this project we have investigated the differences in the neo-Darwinian and transgenerational 
epigenetic view on inheritance, through surveying the literature. We have presented relevant 
mechanisms of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance through examples from the scientific 
literature. We have made a comparative analysis of how the models, on change in science, by 
Lakatos and Kuhn, respectively, fits the change in the view on inheritance from neo-Darwinism 
to transgenerational epigenetics.  
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Neo-Darwinism 
The Modern Synthesis is a term for the synthesis of Darwin’s theory of natural selection with the 
idea that the gene is the only agent of heredity (Gilbert and Ebel, 2009; Noble 2011; Jablonka 
and Lamb, 2005). The Modern Synthesis was formed in the 1930s and 1940s, before the 
structure of DNA was known and it was recognized as the hereditary molecule. The structure 
was finally discovered by Watson and Crick (1953), and it was realized that genes were very 
concrete entities, sequences of DNA, that were transcribed into RNA and translated to protein. 
The random errors in DNA replication were then the source of variation that had been 
theoreticized before the structure of DNA was discovered, along with the variation from the 
random combination of alleles during reproduction. Depending on the source, the integration of 
molecular biology into evolutionary biology has been termed molecular neo-Darwinism 
(Jablonka and Lamb, 2005), molecular Darwinism (Depew and Weber, 2011), and possibly 
others. Like Noble (2010), we will use the term neo-Darwinism, which will include The Modern 
Synthesis and the integration of molecular biology into it. To sum up, the main elements of neo-
Darwinism, for the purpose of this project, are (i) natural selection as the mechanism of 
selection, (ii) DNA as the only agent of heredity, (iii) errors in DNA replication and random 
combinations of alleles during sexual reproduction as the sources of variation. 
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Epigenetics 
Epigenetics is a term that was first introduced by Conrad Waddington in 1942, where he defined 
it as: “A branch of biology which studies the causal interactions between genes and their 
products which bring the phenotype into being” (Goldberg et al., 2007). This definition was 
presented before the discovery of DNA, and the way we define epigenetics now is different from 
Waddington’s original definition. 
 There are different definitions of epigenetics available. Jablonka and Raz (2009) states 
what the study of epigenetics is about: “Epigenetics is the study of the processes that underlie 
developmental plasticity and canalization and that bring about persistent developmental effects 
in both prokaryotes and eukaryotes. At the cellular level, these are the processes involved in cell 
determination and differentiation. At higher levels of biological organization, epigenetic 
mechanisms generate the context-dependent, self sustaining interactions between groups of cells 
that lead to physiological and morphological persistence.” This shows the importance of 
epigenetics in studying developmental biology. Another important aspect of epigenetics is “the 
perpetuation of gene expression and function across cell divisions without changes in DNA 
sequence,” as defined by Heard and Martienssen (2014). So epigenetics is about the development 
and differentiation of cells that are perpetuated across cell divisions, without changing the DNA 
sequence. 
Jablonka and Lamb (2005) and Heard and Martienssen (2014) mention four different 
categories of epigenetic inheritance: Chromatin-marking systems, self-sustaining loops, RNA 
interference and structural inheritance. So far, self-sustaining loops and structural inheritance 
have not been shown to occur in meiosis (Heard and Martienssen, 2014), and so we will not 
elaborate on them here. Also, since they do not seem to transmit through meiosis, it could be 
argued that they should be termed mitotic stability systems instead, following the suggestion of 
Skinner (2011). RNA interference is relevant for transfer through meiosis, but his report will 
focus on chromatin-marking systems and therefore only elaborate this. 
 
Chromatin-marking systems 
In the cell nucleus of eukaryotes, the DNA is wrapped around a core of histone proteins, 
consisting of two of each of the histone proteins H2A, H2B, H3 and H4, forming the nucleosome 
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(Reece et al. 2011). Repeating units of nucleosome for a structure called chromatin, which is the 
compacted even further to form the chromosomes (Nelson and Cox, 2013). The chromatin 
structure and configuration impacts the expression of the gene, by changing how different 
proteins, affecting expression, bind to the chromatin, and can be changed by epigenetic marks. 
Chromatin marks include DNA-methylation and histone modifications, such as acetylation, 
methylation, and phosphorylation. 
 DNA-methylation most frequently happens at the Cytosine-phosphate-Guanine (CpG) 
sites, where a methyl-group is added to the 5 position of cytosine forming 5-Methylcytosine. The 
methyl groups can influence the transcription of genes in two ways. First, methylation changes 
the physical dimensions of the cytosine, and can therefore hinder the binding of transcriptional 
proteins to the gene. Secondly, the methylation can recruit different proteins, which leads to 
formation of heterochromatin (Griffiths et al. 2012). A well-studied example of this is the X-
chromosome inactivation in female mammals (Armstrong, 2014). The enzymes that methylate 
DNA are called DNA-methyltransferases (DNMTs). There are two kinds of methylation: de 
novo methylation and maintenance methylation. De novo methylation is “from the beginning” 
methylation of a DNA double strand, which is unmethylated at both strands. It is catalyzed by 
the enzymes DNMT3A and DNMT3B. Maintenance methylation is methylation of an 
unmethylated CpG site, that is opposite of a methylated one. This is catalyzed by the enzyme 
DNMT1, and is essential for maintaining DNA methylations (Armstrong, 2014). 
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Distinguishing between intergenerational and transgenerational epigenetics. 
When epigenetic inheritance is discussed it is important to have in mind that it is important to 
distinguish between  transgenerational epigenetic inheritance and intergenerational epigenetic 
inheritance. This will be outlined here. 
 
Epigenetic inheritance is a general term, which encompasses all kinds of epigenetic 
modifications that can be transmitted to the next generation. This is sometimes used to include 
mitotic inheritance, as well as meiotic (Jablonka and Raz, 2009), but since there are important 
differences between the two it has been proposed that the replication of the epigenome through 
mitosis should be termed mitotic stability, and not included in the concept of inheritance 
(Skinner, 2011). Though it is not the scope of this project to ultimately determine the correct 
term to use, we will refer only to meiotic inheritance when using the terms epigenetic 
inheritance, intergenerational epigenetic inheritance, and transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance. 
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Figure 1. The F0 generation is defined as the generation exposed to the environment of interest. By affecting the F0-generations gametes, the F-
generation is also affected. If the F0-female is pregnant the fetus (F1) and the fetus gametes (F2) are affected by the environment. When a 
generation has been directly exposed to an environment it is called intergenerational inheritance, whereas the first generation of transgenerational 
inheritance can be observed in either F2 or F3, depending on in utero methods or not (Modified from Dias and Ressler, 2014). 
 
For an effect to be considered transgenerational, it has to last until a generation that was not 
affected by the original stimuli. If the F0 generation is paternal, an effect transmitted beyond the 
F1 generation is considered transgenerational. If the F0 generation is maternal, the uterine 
environment will affect both the F1 generation and the germ cells of the F1 generation, which 
will become the F2 generation, and for this reason only the effects transmitted beyond the F2 
generation is considered transgenerational. Effects that are not transgenerational can be termed 
intergenerational, though it is uncertain whether intergenerational epigenetic inheritance is 
actually due to epigenetic changes or due to the contact with the causative stimuli. Real 
transgenerational phenomena will thus be less confounded by environmental influences. 
When discussing heredity and environment impact on evolution, some of the most 
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commonly mentioned studies in the popular scientific literature are about the Dutch famine in 
1945 and change in available food supply in Överkalix, Sweden (Kragh et al., 2013). 
It was found that a the prenatal exposure to famine did not only affect the F1 generation 
(children exposed to famine in utero) but also the F2 generation in terms of increase in chronic 
diseases. Among the chronic diseases increased in the exposed individuals were obesity, 
cardiovascular disease, type II diabetes, breast cancer and a number of psychiatric diagnoses 
(Painter et al., 2008).  
 Other studies link specific transgenerational responses to changes in food supply (Kaati et 
al., 2002). For instance the cardiovascular disease mortality of offspring was low when the 
father’s availability of food during his slow growth period1 was sufficient, but increased when 
the paternal grandfather’s food availability was not during his slow growth period (Kaati et al., 
2002).   
These studies contribute to the argument that environmental impact is inheritable but they 
cannot be used as examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance because of their 
intergenerational character. 
  
                                                
1 Before period of time before puberty..  
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Thomas Kuhn 
Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996) became, with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, one 
of the most influential philosophers of science in the twentieth century. Here we will first explain 
his concept of the paradigm and its components, and how Kuhn views changes in science as 
paradigm shifts. His model of changes in science will be applied to neo-Darwinism and 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in a later section. 
 
The Paradigm and its Components 
In the postscript of his book (Kuhn, 1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn 
acknowledges that there were “stylistic inconsistencies” in the way he had earlier used the term 
paradigm. He uses the term paradigm in both a global manner and in a local manner. The global 
use covers the shared language, heuristics2, problem solving approaches and perspectives of a 
community of professionals, and the local use is examples, which he calls exemplars. To 
distinguish the global and local use of the term paradigm, Kuhn asks the question: “What do 
[members of a particular community of specialist] share that accounts for the relative fulness of 
their professional communication and the relative unanimity of their professional judgment?” 
(Kuhn 1996, p. 182), and proposes the term ‘disciplinary matrix’ as an answer to his question. 
The disciplinary matrix covers the global use of the term paradigm, and he lists four components 
to the disciplinary matrix: Symbolic generalizations, metaphysical paradigms, values, and 
exemplars. 
Symbolic generalizations are generally accepted expressions, and are the first component 
of the disciplinary matrix. They are laws or definitions of symbols, and can be in symbolic form, 
for example   =   ⋅  or   =   ⋅ , or stated in words, as in “action equals reaction” or “the 
total energy of an isolated system is constant”. 
 Metaphysical paradigms are the shared beliefs in models, and is the second component of 
the disciplinary matrix. These models are used to describe the nature of reality and therefore 
characterize the worldview of the practitioners of the disciplinary matrix. The models can range 
in a spectrum from being ontological to heuristic, and are important for determining which 
                                                
2 Heuristics are experience-based rules or techniques for problem solving, learning, and for guiding actions or doing 
science. (Den Store Danske, s.v. “Heuristik,” accessed December 13, 2014 
http://www.denstoredanske.dk/index.php?sideId=91240) 
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problems are relevant, and which solutions are acceptable. Models in the more ontological end of 
the spectrum are ‘closer to reality’. An example is the atomic theory of matter, which can be 
formulated as ‘matter is composed of discrete units called atoms’. A model in the heuristic end 
of the spectrum is more like an analogy or metaphor, though not all aspects of the compared 
subjects have to be analogous. An example of this is ‘gas particles behave like billiard balls in 
random motion’. 
 Values are the third component of the disciplinary matrix. There are many kinds of 
values, though some of the most important ones, mentioned by Kuhn, are those relating to 
prediction, for example: accuracy, what the permissible margin of error is, quantitative 
predictions are better than qualitative. Some other important values, mentioned by Kuhn, to 
evaluate whole theories, are whether a theory allows for the formulation of puzzles and solution 
of these, simplicity and self-consistency. Values can be shared across disciplines, and there are 
also differences in how they are applied by individuals within the same disciplinary matrix 
(Kuhn, 1996). 
 Exemplars are the fourth component of the disciplinary matrix. This is the local use of the 
term paradigm, which Kuhn proposed, to rid the term paradigm of some of its ambiguity. 
Exemplars are solutions to problems presented to the science student at the beginning of his 
science education, and act as a guide for how to do science. Several examples of exemplars from 
physics are mentioned in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for example problems like the 
inclined plane, the conical pendulum and Keplerian orbits, and instruments like the vernier, the 
calorimeter and the wheatstone bridge (Kuhn, 1996). Some examples from biology could be 
Mendel’s work with pea plants or Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA, since 
they are often mentioned in textbooks, for example Introduction to Genetic Analysis (Griffiths et 
al. 2012), as exemplary solutions to problems within the field. 
 We will in this project use the term paradigm, referring to the disciplinary matrix, and the 
term exemplar, referring to how Kuhn originally used paradigm in a local manner. 
 
From Normal Science to Paradigm Shift 
When a scientist, committing to a certain paradigm, does regular scientific work within that 
paradigm, it is termed normal science. In Kuhn’s words, this is a kind of “puzzle-solving” 
process where the problems articulated by the paradigm are attempted to be solved (Kuhn, 1996). 
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By using the word puzzle, it is implied that the practitioner who does the puzzle-solving expects 
there to be a solution to the puzzle, which he can find by means of his own ability (Bird, 2013). 
In doing normal science the practitioner does not attempt to solve problems, the solution of 
which could be contradictory to the paradigm. Even though this is not attempted, normal science 
will inevitably turn up anomalies, findings that contradict the paradigm, though these can also 
come from the practice of other competing paradigms (Kragh and Pedersen, 1991). Anomalies 
are not in themselves enough to provoke crisis for the paradigm, since they are often dismissed 
as being insignificant or irrelevant by the practitioners of the paradigm, and left for future 
scientists to deal with. But as anomalies accumulate, and the inadequacies of the paradigm gets 
harder to explain by ad hoc assumptions, a crisis is provoked. A crisis does not mean the 
immediate overthrowing of the paradigm, but sets the stage for new paradigms to emerge, to 
explain some of the inadequacies of the old paradigm (Kragh and Pedersen, 1991). The transition 
from the old paradigm to the new, a paradigm shift, is a slow and gradual process, since the 
practitioners have to convert to the new paradigm. According to Kuhn, a change in paradigm 
“cannot be justified by proof”, but is more a matter of persuasion. Most will be willing to convert 
to the new paradigm, and the few remaining will die at some point (Kuhn, 1996, p. 152). When a 
new paradigm eventually becomes the dominating one, a new period of normal science begins, 
and a paradigm shift is complete. 
 According to Kuhn, different paradigms are incommensurable. In his book The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions he compared the incommensurability of two paradigms, with having the 
practitioners, who change paradigm, wear inverting lenses (Kuhn, 1996, p. 122). This means that 
the way the scientists view their work completely changes, and it implies that the two paradigms 
are incomparable. Kuhn was criticized for this theory of incommensurability, since the implied 
incomparability of two paradigms meant that theory choice was an irrational process. He later 
revised his thesis, so that the incommensurability only applied to certain terms that are different 
between the paradigms. He refers to this as a kind of untranslatability (Chen 1997). It is 
important to distinguish between Kuhn’s early and later ideas on incommensurability. Another 
implication, especially of his earlier ideas on incommensurability, is that science is non-
accumulative. Since an new paradigm replaces and destroys an old paradigm, and the two are 
incommensurable, some problems solved by the old paradigm might not be recognized as 
relevant problems in the new, or the solutions might be deemed faulty or unscientific. This is 
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sometimes referred to as Kuhn loss (Bird, 2013). With this non-accumulative view of science 
makes it difficult to see progression in science. But Kuhn also modified his view on this later on, 
in response to criticism of relativism, claiming that new paradigms are better at solving problems 
than those before, and that problem solving ability could be compared between paradigms 
(Kragh and Pedersen, 1991). 
 
Imre Lakatos 
Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) combines the Kuhnian paradigm with the Popperian falsification in 
his model for scientific change. He disagrees with Kuhn’s idea of scientific progress being non-
cumulative and with Popper’s suggestion to immediately abandon a theory if it is falsified by an 
experiment (Kragh & Pedersen, 1991). Inspired by Popper’s ‘demarcation question’, that is to 
distinguish genuine science from pseudo-science, he suggests the ‘research programmes’ as an 
answer to this (Kragh & Pedersen, 1991). His model of changes in science will be applied to 
neo-Darwinism and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in a later section. 
 
Research Programmes: Imre Lakatos’ Model for Scientific Change 
Imre Lakatos combines the Kuhnian paradigm with the Popperian falsification in his model for 
scientific change. He disagrees with Kuhn’s idea of scientific progress being non-cumulative and 
with Popper’s suggestion to immediately abandon a theory if it is falsified by an experiment 
(Kragh & Pedersen, 1991). Inspired by Popper’s ‘demarcation question’, that is to distinguish 
genuine science from pseudo-science, he suggests the ‘research programmes’ as an answer to 
this (Kragh & Pedersen, 1991). 
 Research programmes are complexes of theories, method rules and standards and consists 
of three key features: The ‘hard core’, the ‘protective belt’ and the ‘heuristics’ (Larvor, 1998; 
Taber, 2009). The hard core is the collection of foundational theories of a programme and is 
irrefutable. The hard core cannot be changed without changing the programme itself. As an 
example, the three laws of motion and gravity makes up the hard core of Newton’s research 
programme (Lavor, 1998). Another example is the research programme of the geocentric 
astronomy, where the theories of a geocentric universe, and that heavenly bodies move in perfect 
circles made up the hard core (Taber, 2009). Since the hard core of this research programme 
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could not generate a model for prediction of future planets positions, the researchers were guided 
to try other theories like “putting the sun in the middle” or to “replace the circles with eclipses” 
(Taber, 2009).  
 The protective belt is the collection of disposable auxiliary hypotheses and 
represents the ideas of a research programme, which are constantly changing in order to protect 
the hard core (Taber, 2009). For instance the geometric optics and the theory of atmospheric 
refraction would, amongst other hypotheses, represent the protective belt of Newton’s research 
programme (Lavor, 1998).   
 The heuristics of a research programme is divided into ‘positive heuristics’ and ‘negative 
heuristics’ by Lakatos. The negative heuristics’ function is to guide the research programme in a 
direction where problems, that could destroy the hard core, are avoided (Kragh & Pedersen, 
1991). In other words the negative heuristic is a set of method rules that guides the researchers to 
avoid certain paths in order to keep continuity in the progress of theory (Kragh & Pedersen, 
1991). According to Lakatos it would have been the negative heuristics that guided the 
researchers to new hypotheses like “putting the sun in the middle” in the geocentric programme 
mentioned above, because they lead to destruction of the programmes hard core (Lavor, 1998).  
Conversely the positive heuristic is a set of internal scientific approaches that researchers 
ought to follow, instead of anomalies and experimental tests, in order to progress that programme 
(Kragh & Pedersen, 1991). The Newtonian research programme was guided by positive 
heuristics according to Lakatos. For instance if Newton’s predictions of heavenly bodies’ future 
positions did not fit with the hard core, then the positive heuristics guided him to new hypotheses 
of “observations [being] distorted by the atmosphere or misinterpreted by poor optical theory” 
(Lavor, 1998).  
All together the research programme therefore has four potential components, two of 
which relate to the theoretical content of the programme: The hard core and the protective belt of 
auxiliary hypotheses, and two of which are guiding the researcher’s scientific approaches: 
Positive or negative heuristic (Taber, 2009). Taber sets up the following scheme of the four 
components and illustrates the constant or “invariant” character of the hard core and the negative 
heuristic, and the progressive character of the constantly changing protective belt and the 
forward-driving positive heuristic. See Table 1. 
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Table 1. The four components of Lakatos’ research programme, two of which relate to the theoretical 
content of the programme: The hard core and the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses, and two of 
which are guiding the researcher’s scientific approaches: Positive or negative heuristic (Taber, 2009). The 
table illustrates the constant or ‘invariant’ character of the hard core and the negative heuristic, and the 
progressive character of the constantly changing protective belt and the forward-driving positive 
heuristic. Source: Taber, 2009 
 
Since a research programme is not immediately abandoned when contradicted, as suggested by 
Popper, Lakatos believes that several research programmes can coexist as competing 
programmes (Barker & Gholson, 1985). According to Lakatos the most common reason to 
abandon and replace a theory is experimental failure (Barker & Gholson, 1985). The replacing 
theory must contain the former theory, and furthermore explain the phenomena that the former 
theory failed to do. A successive research programme does even more: It is driven by the 
positive heuristics to new predictions, which are then verified experimentally (Barker & 
Gholson, 1985). A programme that is composed of theories that meet these criteria is said to be 
progressive. A theory can be theoretically progressive when guided by positive heuristics to new 
predictions, and empirically progressive when these new predictions are supported by 
experiments (Barker & Gholson, 1985). Because research programmes are build upon theories, 
the same terms can be used for programmes. A programme is not necessarily progressive in both 
ways simultaneously (Barker & Gholson, 1985). 
Recall that a research programme is not immediately abandoned when challenged or 
contradicted. If a programme is not progressive and not abandoned, it is said to be degenerating. 
This is a temporarily resting stage of a research programme, where no new predictions are made 
and no experimental success is seen (Barker & Gholson, 1985). If a programme fail to turn 
anomalies into examples, or is explained by ad hoc assumptions only a new programme might be 
needed (Barker & Gholson, 1985). 
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Summary of Kuhn and Lakatos’ Theories 
Here we present a summary of Kuhn and Lakatos’ theories of change in science. Note that we 
are referring to Kuhn’s early ideas in this summary, but his later views on incommensurability 
and progress in science will enter into the discussion in a later section. 
 
Kuhn Lakatos 
The scientific progress is driven by 
paradigms, which are complexes of theories, 
method rules, and standards.  
The scientific progress is driven by research 
programmes, which are complexes of 
theories, method rules, and standards. 
Two different paradigms are 
incommensurable and are thus incomparable. 
Two different research programmes are not 
incommensurable, and can even contribute to 
one another. 
The scientific progress is a non-cumulative 
and irrational process. 
The scientific progress is a cumulative and 
rational process. 
A paradigm shift occurs when new theories 
cannot explain the old. 
A problem-shift occurs when new theories can 
explain the old. 
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Examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance 
Here we will present some examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. This has two 
purposes. First, examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in animals are still more 
controversial than in other kingdoms. We have therefore chosen some possibly promising 
examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in animals. Second, these will be referred 
to in a later section where Kuhn and Lakatos’ models are applied to neo-Darwinism and 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance . 
         
Vinclozolin 
One example of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance has been observed in an experiment 
where female gestating rats are exposed to the environmental toxins vinclozolin, one of the most 
commonly used fungicides, and methoxychlor, a pesticide used as replacement for DDT (Anway 
et at., 2005). Vinclozolin is an antiandrogen (Antagonist to the androgens, the male hormones) 
and methoxychlor is an estrogenic compound. 
In mammals the germ cell is epigenetically reprogrammed, which means that the genome 
is demethylated globally followed by a de novo methylation. Before the primordial germ cells 
enter the gonads they are methylated corresponding to a somatic cell, but when they enter the 
gonads a rapid demethylation takes place. This selectively affects single copy imprinted and non-
imprinted genes, whereas repetitive elements are less affected, and therefore demethylated more 
incompletely (Hajkova et al., 2002). Between embryonic days 12 and 15 (E12 to E15) is the 
period when gonadal sex determination (the development of the gonadal ridge into the gonads, 
the testes in males, and the ovaries in females), and development of the testes, takes place. 
During this period the fetal testis contain steroid receptors, both androgen receptor and estrogen 
receptor-β, which sensitizes the testes to androgenic and estrogenic substances, even though they 
are not produced in the testes in that developmental stage (Anway et al., 2005). The metabolites 
of vinclozolin have high affinity for binding to the androgen receptor, which accounts for the 
antiandrogenic effects of vinclozolin exposure (Kelce et al., 1994). Methoxychlor is an estrogen 
receptor-α agonist, an estrogen receptor-β antagonist, and also has antiandrogenic activity 
(Anway et al., 2005; Gaido et al., 1999). Both compounds can therefore affect the steroid 
receptors in the testes during the gonadal sex determination, and have also been shown to 
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influence sex-differentiation, gonadal development, and reproductive functions in the F1 
generation, when exposed during the late embryonic or early postnatal period (Anway et al., 
2005). 
Earlier experiments have shown that daily peritoneal injections (100 or 200 mg/kg dose) 
of methoxychlor or vinclozolin in a gestating female rat, between E8 and E15, induces decreased 
sperm count and increased apoptosis of spermatogenic cells in the F1 generation, and that similar 
exposure between E15 and E20 did not induce these effects (Cupp et al., 2003; Anway et al., 
2005). Anway et al. based their experimental design on these results, focusing on vinclozolin, 
and also examined the effects on the F2, F3 and F4 generations, to examine possible 
transgenerational effects. Only the gestating mother (F0) received the injection of vinclozolin. 
Males and females from the F1 generation, from different litters, were mated to generate the F2 
generation. This was repeated for the F2 generation to generate the F3, and for the F3 generation 
to generate the F4. The gestating mother (F0) of the control group was injected with a 
dimethylsulfoxide buffer and the progeny was bred using the same method as with the non-
control rats. The rats of the F1-F4 generations were killed between 60 and 180 days postpartum, 
and analyses were done for cell apoptosis in testes tissue, sperm count, and sperm forward 
motility. The analysis showed more than a 50% increase in cellular apoptosis, 20% reduction in 
sperm count, and 25-35% reduction in sperm forward motility in the F1-F4 generations. More 
than 90% of the males in all the generations showed increased cellular apoptosis, which means 
that the frequency of the phenotype in the progeny of the vinclozolin treated gestating mother is 
>90%. Also this frequency did not decline with each successive generation. The results were 
statistically significant (P < 0.001) for all generations. Another observation made by Anway et 
al. is that some of the progeny of the vinclozolin treated mother (4 out of 50, so 8%) developed 
complete infertility after the age of 90 days, whereas none of the progeny in the control group 
did. 
Anway et al. (2005) also performed this experiment with methoxychlor, where they 
observed a similar phenotype in the F1 and F2 generation, and concludes that methoxychlor also 
has transgenerational effects (Anway et al., 2005). They do not mention how methoxychlor is 
affecting the F3 generation, which is one of their criteria for claiming an effect to be 
transgenerational. 
24/44 
To investigate whether the phenotype was transmitted through the male germ line, 
Anway et al. performed an outcross experiment, also called outbreeding, where wild-types are 
introduced to the breeding line. Males from the vinclozolin F2 generation were crossed with 
wild-type females, not affected by vinclozolin. The male progeny from this crossing showed the 
same phenotype as the progeny of the vinclozolin treated gestating mother, with increased cell 
apoptosis, decreased sperm count and motility. Females from the F2 vinclozolin generation were 
similarly crossed with wild-type males, but their progeny did not show the characteristic 
phenotype. On the basis of these results Anway et al. concludes that the transgenerational effects 
of vinclozolin are transferred through the male germ line (Anway et al., 2005). 
Anway et al. argues that the appearance of the testis cell apoptosis phenotype is not due 
to DNA mutations, since even high-frequency DNA mutations occur at a lower frequency than 
those observed in the experiment (Anway et al., 2005). Also the random nature of gene 
mutations should produce more variation in phenotype, but this contrasts the very similar 
phenotypes produced in the progeny of the vinclozolin exposed F0 mother. Anway et al. 
therefore concludes that epigenetic mechanisms could produce the observed results, especially 
considering the period (E8 to E15) when the F0 generation was exposed, which is the period the 
germ line reprogramming takes place. Anway et al. performed a PCR-based analysis using a 
methylation-sensitive restriction enzyme, and found 25 sequences with altered DNA 
methylation. The conclude that the results indicate that vinclozolin, and possibly other endocrine 
disruptors, can cause transgenerational epigenetic changes in methylations of the male germ line. 
 
Agouti viable yellow 
Mice with coat colour genes, termed Agouti viable yellow (Avy), seem to be another example of 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. Studies show that the environment of the embryonic 
genome of the mice induces CpG-methylations and changes in gene expression. Avy-genes are 
epialleles and are due to epigenetic modifications variably expressed genetically (Waterland et 
al., 2007). Experiments with female mice show a correlation between the coat colors of the mice 
and the epigenetic mechanism methylation. According to Whitelaw et al. it is the number of the 
methyl-groups that determinate the coat colors of the mice. Another study show that it is the 
colors of the mothers that affect their progeny, as the Avy-genes from the fathers disappear 
during reproduction (Balter, 2006). Since these mechanisms were observed in several 
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generations, they are an example of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance.  
  
Linaria Vulgaris  
The plant Linaria Vulgaris is mentioned as another example of transgenerational epigenetic 
(Cubas et al., 1999). Cuba et al. found that there is are a correlation between Linaria Vulgaris’ 
phenotype and methylations in the epigenome. 
As previously mentioned DNA-methylations can inhibit the transcription. In this case it was 
found that the expression of a transcription factor was silenced by methylations, resulting in 
inheritable epimutation (Whitelaw and Chong, 2004).  
 
Figure 2;  Shows an illustration of the peloric and the original form of Linaria Vulgaris. The peloric form (left). The original Linaria Vulgaris 
(right). Source: Modified from Jablonka and Lamb, 2005. 
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Applying Kuhn’s Model of Change in Science 
Paradigm: Neo-Darwinian inheritance 
Symbolic generalizations 
The symbolic generalizations of a paradigm are, according to Kuhn, sentences to which “group 
members [can] attach the powerful techniques of logical and mathematical manipulation in their 
problem solving enterprise.” The examples of symbolic generalizations Kuhn presents in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions are from physics, and therefore quite well suited for 
mathematical manipulation. Since mathematical manipulation does not apply as aptly to 
biological symbolic generalizations, we will have to focus on how they can be used in the 
problem solving enterprise in other ways. The most important symbolic generalization for neo-
Darwinism in this project, is  DNA as the only agent of heredity. In the neo-Darwinian paradigm 
this has acted as a guide for how to approach problem solving related to heredity, by looking at 
changes in DNA as the cause for hereditary phenomena. The other two symbolic generalizations 
mentioned, natural selection as the mechanism of selection and random errors in DNA 
replication as the mechanism for variation can also act as guides for solving problems. The first 
will guide that practitioner to search for variations that can be affected by natural selection, and 
the second will guide the practitioner to search for mutations in DNA to explain observed 
variation. But since does not necessarily have to involve heredity, we see them as secondary in 
this paradigm. 
 
Metaphysical paradigms 
One general metaphysical paradigm of neo-Darwinism, is seeing the genotype and phenotype as 
analogous to a plan and its product, though the specific metaphors used are different. 
One example of this metaphysical paradigm is from Dickins and Dickins (2008), where a 
robot analogy is made. They write: “Genes are also the principal source of new intrinsic design 
in organisms, having the same functional role as the engineers who alter the design of robots in 
order to meet challenges from the environment.” Even though Dickins and Dickins (2008) 
recognize that other factors than the genes affect the “features of an organism”, they still se the 
gene as the only inherited “intrinsic design” in organisms, like the metaphysical paradigm of 
plan to product. 
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Another example is from Richard Dawkins book The Blind Watchmaker (1986), where 
he sees a cake recipe as a good metaphor for DNA. He writes: “‘Baking powder’ does not 
correspond to any particular part of the cake: its influence affects the rising, and hence the final 
shape, of the whole cake. If ‘baking powder’ is deleted, or replaced by ‘flour’, the cake will not 
rise (...) There will be a reliable, identifiable difference between cakes baked according to the 
original version and the ‘mutated’ versions of the recipe, even though there is no particular ‘bit’ 
of any cake that corresponds to the words in question. This is a good analogy for what happens 
when a gene mutates” (Dawkins, 1986). Dawkins emphasizes how the role of the words does not 
correspond to a specific part of the cake, but has a more systemic impacts. 
 
Values 
The values of a paradigm are like norms for research done and recognized within that paradigm. 
These values are probably easiest to identify in the publishing process. A specific paradigm 
would presumably have certain scientific journals that it finds credible and prestigious. To 
publish in these journals, the research has to live up to certain criteria. To publish in, for 
example, the journal PLOS ONE, there are criteria that the research has to meet (PLOS ONE, 
2014). Since this is a journal that spans many fields of research, including genetics, the general 
values across these fields, for example requirements for accuracy or quantitative over qualitative 
results, will be quite homogeneous. Furthermore the PLOS ONE guidelines refer to other 
guidelines that are commonly used for a certain field of research, for example animal research or 
clinical trials (PLOS ONE). Since the main point of this analysis is to identify differences 
between the paradigms of neo-Darwinism and of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, we 
will not attempt make a complete list of all the values. Instead it is important to note that 
research in traditional genetics and the research in transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is 
often published in the same journals. For this reason the values of the two paradigms will be very 
similar. 
 
Exemplars 
A classic exemplar within genetics is the work of Gregor Mendel, who derived several 
mechanisms that proved to be essential for how understanding heredity (Larsen et al., 2003). 
Mendel crossed purple plants with white, so he could observe their phenotype, and this gave rise 
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to Mendels 2. law: the law of independent assortment (Reece et al., 2011). Crossing purple and 
white flowering plants in the parental generation (P), resulted in purple flowers in the F1 
generation, and the F1 generation was self-pollinated to generate the F2 generation, where 
Mendel observed a 3:1 ratio (Fig. 3) 
  
Figure 3; Shows Mendel’s experiment of crossing the true breeding parents of white and purple flowers (P), crossed over resulting in 
purple flowers in generation F1 and purple and white coloured flowers in generation F2 Source: Modified from Reece et al., 2011. 
 
Paradigm: Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance 
Symbolic generalizations 
There has been a call for an extension of the concept of inheritance, sometimes called inclusive 
inheritance (Danchin et al., 2011), an extended synthesis (Pigliucci, 2007), and possibly other 
names. It is often argued that behavior and culture should be included in this extension (Jablonka 
and Lamb, 2005; Danchin et al., 2011; Danchin et al., 2014), but since our focus is on the 
molecular mechanisms of inheritance we will only consider those in this disciplinary matrix. 
 Many books, articles and scientific papers mention how transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance necessitates an extension of the molecular view of inheritance from being only in the 
genome, to being in the genome and the epigenome (Danchin and Pocheville, 2014; Daxinger 
and Whitelaw, 2012; Jablonka and Raz, 2009; Heard and Martienssen, 2014; Burggren, 2014; 
Grossniklaus et al., 2013; Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Gilbert and Epel, 2009). The main symbolic 
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generalization for the disciplinary matrix of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is therefore 
‘inheritance is in the genome and the epigenome’. 
 
Metaphysical Paradigms 
One can argue that many of the metaphysical paradigms not relating to inheritance will be the 
same for the disciplinary matrix of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance and the matrix for 
neo-Darwinism. For example will the matrices have a common understanding of the structure of 
cells and DNA. Though especially some of the more heuristic (metaphorical) metaphysical 
paradigms concerning the mechanisms of inheritance will be different. 
 In the disciplinary matrix of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance the idea of turning 
genes “on” and “off” will often be seen in popular scientific literature (Kragh et al., 2013), and 
sometimes with more nuances in textbooks (Armstrong et al., 2014, p. 191; Griffith et al., 2013, 
p. 446). This would be an example of a metaphysical paradigm for this disciplinary matrix. In a 
simplified way the chromatin-marking systems, especially the methylation, are seen as on/off-
switches for the genes, and it is obvious from this analogy that the epigenome is important for 
the expression of the genome, and for the expression of the phenotype. Some (Jablonka and 
Lamb, 2005, p. 117) even explains the genome as being analogous to a switchboard where the 
epigenome are all the on/off-switches, controlling the expression of the genes. This is an 
interesting metaphor, though it has to be kept in mind that is of the more heuristic kind. The 
findings that changes in DNA methylation can be inherited transgenerationally (Anway et al., 
2005) makes this metaphysical paradigm relevant for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. 
 
Values 
As argued in the value-section of the neo-Darwinian paradigm, the journals where genetic 
research and epigenetic inheritance research gets published are often the same, and for this 
reason the values for the two paradigms will be very similar. 
 
Exemplars  
In a previous section we discussed the experiment done with vinclozolin by Anway et al. (2005), 
the experiment about the mice agouti viable yellow and the plant Linaria Vulgaris. Since 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is a relatively new field of research, and no textbooks, to 
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our knowledge, have been written about it, it could be argued that some of these examples 
mentioned, could be exemplars for the paradigm of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance. Of 
the ones mentioned, especially the agouti viable yellow mice and the experiments with 
vinclozolin are good candidates. The agouti viable yellow mice are one of the examples very 
often referred to as a good example of epigenetic inheritance. This makes it a good candidate for 
being an exemplar, though one issue, which we will touch more on in the discussion, is that the 
allele has only been observed transferred for two generations. By the strict definition, this would 
then not be considered transgenerational, but only intergenerational epigenetic inheritance. 
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Applying Lakatos’ Model of Change in Science 
In this section we have attempted to apply Lakatos’ theory of research programmes to the neo-
Darwinian view of inheritance and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, as we did in the 
previous section with Kuhn’s theory. Thus laying the foundation for a comparative analysis of 
the two. 
 
Research programme: Neo-Darwinian inheritance 
Hard core: DNA as the only agent of heredity. 
As previously mentioned, the hard core is the very part of the programme that cannot be changed 
without rejecting the whole programme. As with Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations, the hard core 
of the neo-Darwinian research programme will therefore be DNA as the only agent of heredity. 
 
Protective belt: DNA replication being the mechanism for variation. 
One of the hypotheses forming the protective belt in the neo-Darwinian research programme is 
the theory of errors in DNA replication being the mechanism for variation.  
An example of an auxiliary hypothesis for the neo-Darwinian research programme is The 
Central Dogma. This was formulated by Francis Crick in 1958, and describes the transcription 
from DNA to RNA and translation from RNA to protein as a one way process. The Central 
Dogma had to be reformulated to not being a one way process, when Howard Temin in 1970 
discovered reverse transcription, where single-stranded RNA gets converted by retroviruses to 
double-stranded complimentary DNA (cDNA). 
 
Mutations and transgenerational inheritance as positive and negative heuristics. 
A lot of research is still done within the area of genetics relating to the neo-Darwinian view of 
inheritance, and it can therefore be argued that the programme is still guided by positive 
heuristics. Examples of this kind of research is gene sequencing, where certain genes or 
mutations are linked with risks of certain diseases. One example is mutations in one of the two 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes that are considered to increase women’s risk of breast cancer and or 
ovarian cancer (webpage of Kræftens Bekæmpelse, 2014). The positive heuristics of this 
research programme with encourage more research of this kind. 
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As mentioned in a previous section, the negative heuristics is guiding the programme 
away from the areas of research that can potentially destroy the program. The transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance is such a programme, and can thus challenge the neo-Darwinian research 
programme, and constitute anomalies that can force the neo-Darwinian research programme to 
make ad hoc explanations of these. Since the transgenerational epigenetic inheritance cannot be 
explained from this program, without changing the hard core of the programme, it could lead to 
the degeneration of the programme. 
 
The neo-Darwinian research programme is theoretically and empirically progressive. 
Since the neo-Darwinian research programme is guided by positive heuristics to produce new 
theories of linkage between specific gene mutations and heredity of diseases, it is said to be 
theoretically progressive. Furthermore the programme also empirically progressive since these 
predictions and theories seem to be supported by experimental evidence.  
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Research programme: Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance 
Hard core: Inheritance of the genome and the epigenome.  
The hard core in the transgenerational epigenetic inheritance research programme consists of two 
main theories. Firstly this programme acknowledges the genome as one way of passing on 
biological information from one generation to the next. Secondly the programme does also 
acknowledge the epigenome as an equally important way of heredity.  
Another theory of the hard core would be the view on is hereditary variation as being 
both mutations (changes in the DNA sequence) and epigenetic modifications that might have 
been caused by environmental factors or other things.  
 
Protective belt: Inheritable chromatin-marking.  
The protective belt is the collection of theories supporting and protecting the hard core. In this 
case theories like inheritable epigenetic mechanisms of chromatin marking like DNA-
methylations as seen in the studies with Agouti viable yellow () and Linaria Vulgaris (). . 
Another example of this is the inheritance of histone-acetylation as seen through at least 13 
generations in Drosophila melanogaster3 suggested by Sollars and his colleagues (Sollars et al., 
2003). These theories are potentially disposable and can be disproved without the necessity of 
abandoning the entire research programme.  
 As previously mentioned in the section where we distinguish between transgenerational 
and intergenerational epigenetic inheritance, the term is being used to describe several different 
phenomena. The definition of transgenerational epigenetics used in this report is an example of 
the protective belt’s function. By changing the term of transgenerational epigenetics, the belt 
turned a critique or an anomaly into a validating hypothesis that protects the hard core.  
 
Trans- and intergenerational inheritance as positive and negative heuristics. 
Since the function of the positive heuristics is to set up a series of method rules that guide the 
researchers in a direction profitable for the programme, it is obvious that this programme needs 
to continue finding examples of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance where the mechanisms 
responsible for the observations are detectable. One could also argue that the research concerning 
                                                
3 Fruit fly 
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sexual reproduction (meiosis) has a bigger saying in terms of evolution and that the programme 
therefore should encourage more research in this field.  
 Contrary this research programme’s negative heuristics suggests that the researchers 
avoid intergenerational epigenetics where in utero observations are confused with 
transgenerational epigenetics.  
  
The research programme is theoretically progressive and empirically progressive. 
The transgenerational epigenetic inheritance research programme is empirically progressive 
because of the experimental data supporting the theories of transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance. These theories make the programme additionally theoretically progressive. On the 
other hand the programme is not as theoretically progressive as one could hop, because of its 
missing theories of how the epigenetic mechanisms are inherited. 
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Discussion 
In this project we have attempted to outline the components of the paradigms neo-Darwinian 
inheritance and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, respectively. This assumes that it is 
viable to view transgenerational epigenetic inheritance as being separate from the neo-
Darwinian paradigm, and so this is what we shall discuss here. First we will discuss the case 
with respect to Kuhn’s model, and the with respect to Lakatos’ model 
 
How well does Kuhn’s model fit? 
The most important symbolic generalization of neo-Darwinism, as we have outlined it, is DNA 
as the only agent of heredity. This symbolic generalization conflicts with the findings of studies 
of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, where other systems than DNA can facilitate 
inheritance. For this reason the paradigm of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance must have 
another symbolic generalization, which includes these findings. This is a central aspect of what 
makes them different. The metaphysical paradigms are, in a sense, extensions of the symbolic 
generalizations, in the form of metaphors or analogies, which reflect the outlook of the 
practitioners in the paradigm. The metaphysical paradigms reflect the difference between the 
symbolic generalizations. The symbolic generalizations and metaphysical paradigms of the 
paradigm of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance could be seen as extensions to their neo-
Darwinian counterparts, in the sense that epigenetics brings an extra layer of control to the 
genetics, like the on/off-buttons in the switchboard analogy. However, the situation is certainly 
more complex than just adding on/off-buttons to the genes, since the genome and epigenome 
interact and influence each other forming a complex system (Skinner, 2011). With this in mind it 
will be necessary to view the change as being a new paradigm, and not just an extension of the 
neo-Darwinian paradigm. The values of the two paradigms are, arguably, very similar, since 
results from both genetic and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance research are published in 
the same journals. The exemplars of the neo-Darwinian paradigm are very well established, and 
can be found in numerous textbooks for genetics (Griffith et al., 2012; Reece et al., 2011). This is 
a good indication that it is a mature paradigm. Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance on the 
other hand is still a relatively new field of research, and so far there does not seem to exist a 
textbook dedicated to the subject. This makes it harder to identify exemplars for the paradigm of 
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transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, though some examples frequently mentioned in the 
literature could be suitable candidates for exemplars. We have previously mentioned some 
possible candidates, but they are not as well established as the exemplars from the neo-
Darwinian paradigm, and thus the paradigm of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is not as 
mature as the neo-Darwinian paradigm. 
 Another important part of Kuhn’s theory of change in science is his theory of 
incommensurability. This is especially interesting in comparing the paradigms of neo-Darwinism 
and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, since they share a lot of the same foundational 
concepts. It is important to note that the practitioners of the two paradigms go to the same 
universities (there is no university just for transgenerational epigenetic inheritance), and thus 
share mostly the same basic education in biology, including genetics. Also a lot of the people 
working with transgenerational epigenetic inheritance are trained geneticists (e.g. Eva Jablonka 
and Marion Lamb). Though it is important to remember that being involved in genetics research 
does not necessarily imply being a part of the neo-Darwinian paradigm, although the opposite is 
often true. Besides formal education, the practitioners of the two paradigms also publish in the 
same journals. As mentioned earlier, this indicated that the values of the paradigms must be quite 
similar, but it also indicates that a substantial amount of basic knowledge is shared between the 
two paradigms. In the light of these similarities it is difficult to see the two paradigms as 
completely incommensurable. 
What is not similar between the paradigms is how they view inheritance. The neo-
Darwinian notion of inheritance of plan to product and the complex interwoven systems in the 
paradigm of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance could be deemed incommensurable, since 
one cannot be understood from the logic of the other. In some specific cases, for example in 
diseases that are genetically determined, the plan to product analogy could be viewed as a 
special case of the more complex interwoven system of genetics and epigenetics. This is 
analogous to how Kuhn views the relationship between Newtonian and Einsteinian physics: “[...] 
the physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no means identical with those of the 
Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is 
convertible with energy. Only at low relative velocities may the two be measured in the same 
way, and even then they must not be conceived to be the same.)” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 102). In the 
case of mass, it is only at low velocities that they can be measured in the same way, and in the 
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case of inheritance it is only in some special cases that the plan to product notion may accurately 
describe a phenomenon. And even here, as Kuhn stresses, one must not conceive the two as the 
same. 
An implication of Kuhn’s theory of incommensurability theory is his view that science is 
non-cumulative. Since so much basic knowledge of genetics is also applied in epigenetics and 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, it is hard to see how it is non-cumulative. The symbolic 
generalization of neo-Darwinian that DNA is the only agent of heredity will have to be rejected, 
and replaced by a more inclusive one encompassing transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, and 
also behavioral and cultural inheritance as many has suggested (Jablonka and Raz, 2009; 
Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Danchin and Pocheville, 2014; Danchin et al., 2011), though that is 
not the scope of this project. Although the linear plan to product view of inheritance is replaced 
by a interwoven complex system view, it seems that too much basic knowledge is shared 
between the two paradigms for Kuhn’s non-cumulative view of science to apply to this change. 
 To sum up, it seems that Kuhn’s original theory of incommensurability, as stated in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, does not generally describe the two paradigms well. Many of 
the elements of the paradigms are similar and too much basic knowledge is shared between the 
paradigms for them to be incommensurable, even though some of their constituent elements are 
indeed incommensurable. Also, Kuhn’s view on the non-cumulative nature of science does not 
seem to apply well to the change from the neo-Darwinian paradigm to the paradigm of 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, since they share so much basic knowledge, scientific 
journals and education. 
 
How well does Lakatos' model fit? 
As with the components of the Kuhnian paradigm, we have attempted to outline the components 
of Lakatos’ research programmes: neo-Darwinian inheritance and transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance, respectively. As previously mentioned this assumes that it is viable to separate the 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance from the neo-Darwinian view on inheritance. In the 
following we have discussed the viability of the way we have outlined the two research 
programmes.  
 One can argue that it is impossible to unite the two very different views on heredity in 
one research programme, because of the conflicting assumptions of hereditary variation being or 
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not being affected by the environment of an individual. And since the two programmes are set up 
to comment on evolution, the hard core of the two cannot be changed to something broader like 
natural selection.  
 On the other hand one can argue that the assumption of hereditary variation not being 
affected by the environment of an individual has been an auxiliary hypothesis protecting the 
theory of natural selection as the hard core. Mainly because of the fact that the transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance research programme does not eliminate the idea of the genome as an 
essential part of inheritance, one can argue that the transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is an 
addition to the limited understanding of heredity more than a critique. But for this to be the case 
it would have been necessary for the neo-Darwinian view on inheritance not to claim that the 
environment of an individual does not affect hereditary variation.  
 Assuming that there are two different research programmes, it is possible that the 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance research programme is more progressive than the neo-
Darwinian research programme. This assumption is based on the programmes acknowledgement 
of inheritance of both the genome and the epigenome, which indicates that the transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance programme could contain empirical progress of the neo-Darwinian 
research programme as well. Conversely the neo-Darwinian research programme is more 
progressive in the sense that there is much more research in this area (empirically progressive) 
and that there is a molecular understanding for most of the predictions (theoretically 
progressive). In that sense, the discovery of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance might be an 
anomaly, which cannot be explained by neo-Darwinian research programme, and therefore has 
the potential of making the programme go into a degenerating phase.  
According to Lakatos it is possible for two research programme to coexist, meaning that it is not 
necessary for one programme to be victorious, which seems to be the case here, since none of the 
two programmes are to be abandoned. 
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Conclusion 
We found some important differences in how Kuhn and Lakatos’ models of scientific change 
apply to the change from the neo-Darwinian view of inheritance to transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance. Kuhn views paradigms as incommensurable and knowledge as non-cumulative, 
whereas Lakatos views research programmes as commensurable and knowledge as cumulative.  
Neo-Darwinism views DNA as the only agent of heredity, whereas transgenerational 
epigenetic inheritance does not. This has important implications for evolution, since 
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance could allow inheritance of acquired characteristics.  
Since the two theories share basic knowledge from biology, scientific journals and formal 
education of their practitioners, it is hard to view them as incommensurable, and the change in 
views of inheritance as a non-cumulative process. In Lakatos’ model for scientific change both 
programmes were found to be theoretically and empirically progressive, and this fits with 
Lakatos’ idea of scientific change as a slow process, where different programmes can compete 
for years before one of them is abandoned. For these reasons we find it viable to describe this 
case of scientific change using Lakatos’ theory of research programmes, whereas Kuhn’s theory 
of paradigm shifts does not seem to be a fitting description.  
 
Perspectives 
The case of neo-Darwinism and transgenerational epigenetic inheritance that we have looked at 
could also be studied with other relevant philosophers of science, for example Larry Laudan with 
his theories of research traditions, or Karl Popper with critical rationalism. This would bring 
more nuances to the understanding of the changing view on inheritance. 
 Here we have only touched upon the molecular aspect of inheritance, but in the future it 
will probably be necessary to integrate both behavioral and cultural inheritance into a new 
synthesis of evolution, as suggested by for example Danchin et al. (2011) and Jablonka and 
Lamb (2005). 
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